요조 - Happy Birthday

happy birthday to you happy birthday to you
사랑하는 그대의 생일 축하합니다
愛するあなたの誕生日おめでとうございます

크게 숨을 마시고 다시 내쉬고
大きく息を飲んでまた息を吐き出して
럭키아파트 주차장도 지금 잔뜩 긴장하고 있네요
ラッキーアパート（釜山のバス停？）駐車場も　いま　ぎっしりと　緊張していますね


알고 있나요 그대 나의 기도 속 주인공
知ってますか？　あなたは　私の企画の中の主人公
당신의 작은 두 손에 나의 전부가 꼭 맞네
あなたの小さい両手に私の全部がぴったりだね

추운 겨울 밤 만든 그댈 위한 나의 눈사람은
寒い冬の夜作った　君のための私の雪だるまは
더운 날이 온대도 절대 녹지 않네
暑い日が訪れても　絶対に溶けないね

당신은 나의 멈추지 않는 하나의 노래
あなたは私の止まらないひとつのうた
행복하게 더 행복하게 언제나 행복하길
幸せに　さらに幸せに　いつも幸せになるのを

고마워요 사랑해요 happy birthday to you

もやしソング

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lniOAYKIdXg&feature=player_embedded

콯나물 맛있어
콯나물 시원해
길쭉 길쭉

아삭　さくっと

시원해　すがすがしくて
개운해　すっきりして

상쾌해　さわやかで

착한　優しい

旧iMacサルベージデータ

across the table 　直接の、面と向かった
precondition　前提条件

yea　賛成
nay　反対ひょう

deregulation　規制撤廃
come out swinging　強気に出る

surplus　余り

Treasury Secretary　財務長官

plunge　急落する（価格が）

command of English　英語力

"일"と"날"の違い

일　漢字音
날　固有語

ということのようだ

少女時代で…

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xgubec_yyyy-yyyyyep-2-3_fun


자랑합니다　自慢する
여신　女神
혼자 　ひとりで
웃는다 　笑う

韓国語動画講座３課

저도요 私もです
어때요? どうですか？

少女時代

자랑한다 自慢する
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xgsnf5_yyyyyyyyyep-1-5_fun

소녀시데B

제발 　どうか
웃지마요　笑わないでください
진심이니　本気なの
놀리지도 말아요　からかわないでよ



과연　果たして
자신만만　自信満々

daumの少女時代ＣＭリンクとブログとか

■Daumリンク
http://search.daum.net/search?w=tot&q=%40%EA%B2%80%EC%83%89%EC%9D%B4%EB%8B%AC%EB%9D%BC%EC%A7%84%EB%8B%A4&t__nil_brandingspecial=banner&nil_id=1

■韓国音楽とかのブログ
http://ameblo.jp/kid94ad02/archive1-201010.html

소녀시대で学ぶ韓国語

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EW6WTdMCnio&NR=1

ユリ는 スヨン에게 개인기를 뺏긴 적이 있다
ユリはスヨンに個人技を奪われたことがある

재연도 잘 하고
再演も上手で
맛을 잘 살려
味をよく生かして

휴대전화
携帯電話

정각 알림음
定刻お知らせ音

인정!
認定

또 다른 건?
また他の件?

성대모사
声帯模写

한수위!
一枚上!

다른 휴대전화 알림음은?
他の携帯電話お知らせ音は?

완승
完勝

******
오늘의 명장면
今日の名場面

악몽
悪夢

나쁘지 않네요
悪くありませんね
****
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gdt6tRGiKA&NR=1&feature=fvwp
이게 다 된거야
これができたよ

너무 맛이 없게...
とてもまずく...

구박해
虐待して

얼마나 잘 한다고
どれくらい上手だと

더 해
もっとして

그럴 수 밖에 없었구나
そうしなければならないんだな
*****
제가 졌어요
私が負けました

*****
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQnTSEdq7YM&feature=related

알잖아
わかってるでしょう

알면서
知っていながら
*****
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hW0gC3hILc0&feature=related
무남독녀
부모님의 소중한 딸 서현입니다
男兄弟がない一人娘
ご両親の大切な娘ソヒョンです

엄마 일본어 공부하고 싶다고 하셨죠?
제가 일본어 책꼭 사드릴 게요
ママ日本語勉強したいといわれたでしょう？
私が日本語本必ず買って差し上げますね

키워 주셔서 감사합니다
育てて下さってありがとうございます
*******
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQnTSEdq7YM
続き（意訳）：
ス：（携帯に話す）ナミソン。ほら。
ソ：わー、すごいですね
ス：ああ、ここねー、ドラマが撮影された
ソ：そうそう、ここに自転車があるでしょ。これカップルが乗るん ですけど、それに乗りたいんですよ。
ス：ホント？　一人で乗るのは難しいよ。
ソ：えー、もちろん二人で行くんですよ
ス：誰と？
ソ：わかってるでしょー
ス：誰？
ソ：知ってるくせにー
ス：姐さんはいかないよ。忙しいし。
ソ：姐さんじゃないよ
ス：誰！？
ソ：私よ
ス：あなたと誰なの？
ソ：わかってるでしょー
ス：誰？.....何？....何て？....じゃあ、ここに話して
ソ：できないですよー
ス：あー、誰よー

From Arka

asynchronous　非同期
obedient　素直な

절친노트-소녀시대

12시에는 자야해요. 12時には寝なければなりません。

농담인줄 알았는데... 冗談だと思ったが

그러나 しかし

12시 되면 집에 가서 취침 12時なれば家に行って就寝

모범소녀 模範少女

감탄 感心

경악 驚き

그리고 바르게 사는 것에 대해서 そして正しく生きることに対して

왈가왈부할 일은 아닌 것 같고요 是非を言うことではないようだよ

융통성을 키우도록 도와주 세요 融通性を育てるように助けて下さい

현모양처 賢母良妻

불쑥 いきなり

깜짝이야 びっくりした

갑자기 마이크를 집어든 突然マイクをつかんだ

reminisce 回想する

（翻訳用）해주고 싶은 얘기

제목: 해주고 싶은 얘기 (Story I want to tell)
가수: 이삭&지연 (Isak and JiYeon)

내가 조금 더 다가가서
그댈 조금 더 가까이에서
보고싶죠 웃고싶죠
내 이 마음 다 보여주고 싶죠

내가 먼저 고백 할래요
그댈 먼저 안아줄 꺼예요
언제까지 영원까지
마음속 모든 게 타버릴 때까지

아직 별다른 사이 아니라도
내 마음을 그댄 모르더라도
I'll be there with you

내 사랑 그대에게 해주고 싶은 말
영원히 I'm gonna be with you
숨쉴 수 없을 만큼 말조차 못할 만큼
지금은 이럴 수밖에 없지만

조금 더 그대에게 가까워지는 난
언젠간 말할 수 있을꺼야
숨쉴 수 없을 만큼 말조차 못할 만큼
이렇게 그대를 사랑한다고

아직 별다른 사이 아니라도
내 마음을 그댄 모르더라도
I'll be there with you

내 사랑 그대에게 해주고 싶은 말
영원히 I'm gonna be with you
숨쉴 수 없을 만큼 말조차 못할 만큼
지금은 이럴 수밖에 없지만

조금 더 그대에게 가까워지는 난
언젠간 말할 수 있을꺼야
숨쉴 수 없을 만큼 말조차 못할 만큼
이렇게 그대를 사랑한다고

나의 사랑 오 나의 기쁨
그대와 함께 하는 이 여름 밤
나의 모든 이 마음속을
가득 채워주는 그대와(나의 모든 그대와)

내 사랑 그대에게 해주고 싶은 말
영원히 I'm gonna be with you
숨쉴 수 없을 만큼 말조차 못할 만큼
지금은 이럴 수밖에 없지만

조금 더 그대에게 가까워지는 난
언젠간 말할 수 있을꺼야(있을꺼야)
숨쉴 수 없을 만큼 말조차 못할 만큼
이렇게 그대를 사랑한다고

korean

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2kFIK3MCsc&NR=1

애교　愛嬌？

어색하다　「不自然だ」「ぎこちない」「そぐわない」「窮屈だ」

어색애교 ぎこちない愛嬌？

귀여워　かわいい

못하는 게 매력인 거 같아요 出来ないことが魅力のようです

약간 서투니카 더 귀여운 若干下手なのがさらにかわいい

윙크도 열심히 연습하는　ウインクも熱心に練習する

다시 한번 도전 もう一度挑戦

과연?　果たして？

＊＊＊

생각하다　考える

나도 모르게　思わず

韓国語学校1日目

■固有語数詞（時間・回数・年齢・人数）

하나
둘
셋
넷
다섯
여섯
일곱
여덟
아홉
열

스물
서른
마흔

■助数詞
하나>한
돌>도
셋>세
넷>네
あと一緒
・
・
・
스물>스무

（翻訳用）The truth about venture capitalists, Part 2

As promised:

Comparing venture firms, and comparing partners within firms:

When raising venture capital, remember that venture firms vary wildly in style and quality.

For example, some venture firms are very entrepreneur-friendly. Others are notoriously brutal.

Interestingly, financial success in the venture capital profession does not seem to be correlated to entrepreneur-friendliness.

Individuals (partners) within each venture firm vary wildly in style, personality, knowledge, experience, ability to be helpful, drive, and ethics.

Personally I'd recommend being more focused on picking the right partner than picking the right firm.

This is slightly counterintuitive advice -- and firm quality does matter -- but the partner is the person you're going to be working with. The other people at the firm you will see probably twice in the whole lifespan of your company.

Best of both worlds is to pick a strong partner at a strong firm, but be aware going in that even strong firms have weak partners.

Venture capital professionals arguably used to be a more homogeneous group: the founders and pioneers of the business, and their hand-picked proteges who had grown up as venture capitalists under close supervision and with rigorous training.

The explosion of venture capital in the late 90's has led to a much broader range of people becoming partners in venture capital firms.

Many partners today have little venture capital experience but come out of an operating background (an executive role at a big company, or experience as an entrepreneur with their own startup), or come out of some other background (corporate attorney or executive recruiter), or come straight out of business school with no meaningful experience whatsoever.

There are pros and cons to working with any of these kinds of partners.

For example, VCs with operating experience are great when it comes to sitting down and talking about how to run a business, but sometimes they have less perspective (because their career was probably focused on one or two companies, whereas a professional VC has probably invested in 30+ companies), and they may have trouble keeping their hands off the steering wheel.

A VC with an executive recruiting background can be incredibly helpful at recruiting -- one of the main areas in which a VC can add value (see below).

And a VC who used to be an attorney can be very helpful when you need to get a parking ticket fixed.

But there's probably still no substitute for the VC who has been a VC for 20 years and has seen more strange startup situations up close and personal than you can imagine.

A venture capitalist's ideal investment:

A venture capitalist's ideal investment is the one that would be a huge success without her.

How much help, and what kinds of help, you can expect from your VC:

Assuming your startup does not fall in the category of a VC's ideal investment, what kinds of help can you hope for from your VC?

First, it's important to really internalize that the founders of a startup are the ones who have to make a startup succeed.

Odds are, nothing your VC does, no matter how helpful or well-intentioned, is going to tip the balance between success and failure.

In addition, VCs are -- usually -- incredibly busy people. Sitting on as many as a dozen boards, sourcing new investments, tracking the fast-moving technology industry, raising money and managing their LPs, and pitching in on their partners' companies and their problems takes up a lot of time.

(Although every once in a while you will run into a VC who is lazy as sin -- but that's a topic for another post, when I've had more to drink.)

The best assumption to make is that your VC's primary value add is the cash they are investing.

Then you'll always be surprised on the upside.

Additional areas in which a VC can help include: recruiting, strategy, partner introductions, customer introductions, additional fundraising, and generally being a good sounding board and source of advice and industry knowledge.

Some firms run incredibly helpful programs such as forums in which new consumer Internet startups can interact with major advertisers, for example.

The only real way to find out how much help you can really expect from your new VC is to ask the founders of other companies funded by that same partner.

Finally, never expect the help to just happen unsolicited. If you want it, ask for it proactively.

You actually don't want a VC who provides too much help without being asked. I leave the why as an exercise for the reader.

How VCs spend an awful lot of their time, and why you should feel sorry for them:

My friends who are VCs seem to spend a surprising amount of their time working with their failing companies.

The reason goes right back to the definition of a VC's ideal investment: their winners are succeeding -- they don't need very much help.

Some of the best VCs in the industry spend most of their time on their successes, helping to boost them to higher and higher levels of success.

But generally, life in the VC trenches seems to consist of trying to jumpstart or otherwise fix fatally flawed startups.

Can you imagine how un-fun that would be?

Venture capitalists: soulless and rapacious capitalists, or surprisingly generous philanthropists? Or both?

Here's something surprising about venture capitalists: their primary job is often helping very worthwhile nonprofits build larger and larger endowments to be able to continually make the world a better place.

The largest investors in many top-tier venture capital firms are nonprofits -- particularly universities and large philanthropic foundations.

This is partially because such institutions are very patient investors and have very long time horizons. But this is also partially because many of the top venture capitalists feel a real sense of obligation and mission to help such vital organizations grow and flourish.

Traditionally this has been hard to see because venture capital firms have wrapped the identities of their investors (limited partners, in the lingo) in confidentiality agreements. But more recently, via certain SEC filings and disclosures by public universities, it has become possible to get a glimpse into the investor bases of some of the world's best venture capital firms.

For example, it has been previously well publicized that you can see who Sequoia's investors are by reading the SEC disclosure on the Google/Youtube acquisition.

You can see in that filing that Sequoia's major investors include such universities as Amherst, Brown, Colby, Columbia, and Dartmouth -- and that's just into the D's. Similarly, philanthropic foundations invested in Sequoia include the Ford Foundation, the Moore Foundation, the Irvine Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Hewlett Foundation.

This is not unusual.

The best VCs get to improve society in two ways: by helping new companies take shape and contribute new technologies and medical cures into the world, and by helping universities and foundations execute their missions to educate and improve people's lives.

Why we should be thankful that we live in a world in which VCs exist, even if they yell at us during board meetings, assuming they'll fund our companies at all:

Imagine living in a world in which professional venture capital didn't exist.

There's no question that fewer new high-potential companies would be funded, fewer new technologies would be brought to market, and fewer medical cures would be invented.

We should not only be thankful that we live in a world in which VCs exist, we should hope that VCs succeed and flourish for decades and centuries to come, because the companies they fund can do so much good in the world -- and as we have seen, a lot of the financial gains that result flow into the coffers of nonprofit institutions that themselves do huge good in the world.

Remember, professional venture capital has only existed in its modern form for about the last 40 years. In that time the world has seen its most amazing flowering of technological and medical progress, ever. That is not a coincidence.

How to make a VC's head explode, in one easy step:

Point out to her that her compensation from carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income, not capital gains, since she's receiving a fee for service and it's not her capital at risk.

（翻訳用）The truth about venture capitalists, Part 3

Bonus chapter!

(This will be the last post on venture capital for a while, if I can help it.)

The current venture capital environment in the United States is characterized by a very large number of venture firms (866, according to the National Venture Capital Association), investing an extraordinarily large amount of capital (over $7 billion in the first quarter of 2007 alone, according to Price Waterhouse).

Traditionally the venture capital industry was said to experience a "seven fat years, seven lean years" model -- seven years of boom, followed by seven years of bust.

Following that pattern, the late 60's/early 70's were great (the "-tronics" boom -- this is when Intel was funded by Arthur Rock), the mid-70's were terrible, 1978-1985 was great (the PC!), '86-92 was terrible, '93-99 was fantastic, and '00-06 was not so good.

As you'd expect, inflows of capital to venture firms during the lean years typically shrank dramatically -- venture capital returns are terrible during the lean years, and who in their right mind wants to put more money into an investment vehicle with terrible returns?

This capital inflow shrinkage would then lead to a significant percentage of venture firms closing their doors (technically, not raising new funds -- the venture capital firm equivalent of going under) -- especially the newer, less proven ones.

Ultimately, capital inflows would shrink to the point where the remaining venture firms were managing a much smaller base of cash, which primed the pump for dramatic investment returns over the next seven fat years: less capital + a new wave of high-growth startups = explosive investment returns.

That is the cycle that has played out every time -- except this time.

Let's examine that $7 billion invested by venture firms in the first quarter of 2007.

Annualized, that is an annual investment rate of about $28 billion per year.

Pulling the data on venture capital investing by year over the last 10 years, we see that this is, as you might expect, substantially lower than 1999's $54 billion and 2000's $105 billion (what a year!)...

...but, higher than 1997's $15 billion and 1998's $21 billion.

And that rate of investment has been broadly consistent for the last several years -- in fact, it's been trending up.

Even when you adjust for inflation, venture capital funding is flowing into venture firms and out to startups at a higher rate in 2007 than in 1997 and 1998.

Those of you remember 1997 and 1998 will remember that those were true boom times for venture capital. The returns on funds from '93-95 were extraordinary -- some of the best ever -- and limited partners were shoveling money into venture firms, leading VCs to fund new companies as fast as they possibly could.

Yet, despite disastrous venture returns on average from 2000-2006, the cash spigot from investors in venture capital firms continues to be wide open to a level where VCs can be more active in 2007 than they were in 1998.

While some older, stale venture firms have recently shut down -- Sevin Rosen and Yankee come to mind -- the rate of venture firm death has not beenanywhere close to what you'd expect, and in fact many new funds have been formed and raised money in the last few years.

And the cash just keeps on coming.

Somehow we've ended up in a paradox: venture capital returns, on average, have been terrible, but contrary to historical precedent, the money keeps flooding in, venture firms keep going, and you have more money chasing deals than you did in the middle of the dot com boom.

How can we explain this?

In a nutshell:

Institutional investors who invest in venture funds -- large university endowments, philanthropic foundations, and pension funds -- began radically shifting their investment strategies in the early to mid 1990's, and that shift has led to private equity generally, and venture capital specifically, becoming a permanent "asset class" for those investors.

I call this the "asset-classization" of venture capital.

Here's how it works:

A large institutional investor like a university endowment runs its investment strategy with a top-down approach that says, we'll put x% in stocks, y% in bonds, and so on -- this is called asset allocation.

The actual details of which stocks, which bonds, etc. are less important -- the big decision is what percentage of the total capital to put in which asset classes, because when you run a huge pool of capital, that's what mathematically drives your returns. (You can't put enough money into any single investment to really move the needle, at least not without being irresponsible, so you have to think in broad strokes -- in terms of asset classes.)

Traditionally, such large institutional investors were quite conservative. An asset allocation that was perhaps 60% US equities, 30% US bonds, and 10% cash would not have been unreasonable.

Really daring institutional investors might have allocated some percentage to non-US equities, or (gasp) high-yield "junk" bonds.

This all started to change in the late 80's and early 90's when a group of advanced thinkers, such as David Swensen, then and now head of the Yale University endowment, crunched the numbers and realized that if they had a long-term time horizon (which they did -- Yale and its peers are expected to be around for some time), they could generate higher returns by allocating more of their capital to so-called "alternative asset classes" -- basically, anything other than public stocks, bonds, and cash.

This meant hedge funds, real estate partnerships, commodities, timber, leveraged buyout firms -- and venture capital.

To read about this new strategy -- and it is a fascinating strategy -- pick up a copy of David Swensen's excellent book Pioneering Portfolio Management, which describes his approach in detail. (Be sure to also pick up a copy of his book for individual investors -- Unconventional Success -- which explains whyyou can't pursue this strategy without getting your clock cleaned.)

The institutions such as Yale and its peers that adopted a Swensen-style strategy did fantastically well in the 1990's, and outperformed (technically, "kicked the ass of") any institution that had an older, more conservative investment policy.

This predictably led a significant number of institutions to shift massively into alternative investments and venture capital in the late 90's, just in time to get hammered by the crash of 2000-2002.

Here's the interesting part: that hammering -- by people who, say, only started investing in venture funds in 1999 -- has not resulted in a significant pullback on the part of institutional investors from venture capital.

Instead, venture capital has become an apparently permanent asset class of many large institutional investors -- and increasingly, smaller institutional investors.

Those institutional investors are managing so much money -- literally trillions of dollars -- that even a very small asset allocation to venture capital represents an enormous amount of cash -- tens of billions of dollars per year.

An organization called NACUBO (don't ask) tracks asset allocation behavior of university endowments, and tells us that the average large ($1+ billion) university endowment had a 3.5% asset allocation to venture capital in 2006.

3.5% of a ginormous amount of money is a lot of money.

But it's a small percentage of the total base, so apparently what's been happening is that although returns on venture capital have been poor (technically, "sucking") for the last several years, institutions that invest in venture capital are not taking that much actual pain on their overall asset bases, and they don't see that many better alternatives, and so they're sticking with their overall asset allocations and therefore sticking with venture capital.

You can argue that this is smart -- that such institutions are very well set up for the next venture capital boom, and that they will do very well over the next 10-20 years with this strategy -- versus the old approach of pulling out just before the sector was set to boom again.

You can also argue that this is not smart -- that this is leading to more venture dollars chasing few good deals and long-run terrible returns for everyone. Particularly since historically, most of the positive returns for venture capital have gone to the top 10% of venture firms -- or maybe even the top 10 venture firms -- and most of the money going into venture capital as an asset class by definition is going into the other 90% of venture firms.

But regardless, it does seem to be the case.

And that's why, from where I sit in Silicon Valley, there are probably 200 venture capital firms within 20 miles with likely over $20 billion of capital at their disposal chasing a very small number of good potential investments, despite terrible average returns for the asset class over the last seven years.

I love this country.